University of Colorado Law School

Colorado Law Scholarly Commons
Articles

Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship

2006

Rethinking the Great Lakes Compact
Mark Squillace
University of Colorado Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.law.colorado.edu/faculty-articles
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, International Law Commons, Natural Resources Law
Commons, and the Water Law Commons

Citation Information
Mark Squillace, Rethinking the Great Lakes Compact, 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1347, available at
http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/articles/380/.

Copyright Statement

Copyright protected. Use of materials from this collection beyond the exceptions provided for in the Fair Use and
Educational Use clauses of the U.S. Copyright Law may violate federal law. Permission to publish or reproduce is
required.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Colorado Law Faculty Scholarship at Colorado Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of Colorado Law
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lauren.seney@colorado.edu.

+(,121/,1(
Citation: 2006 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1347 2006
Provided by:
William A. Wise Law Library

Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Tue Mar 28 15:59:48 2017
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information

RETHINKING THE GREAT LAKES COMPACT
Mark Squillace"
2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 1347

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ..........................................................
1347

I.B ACKGROUND ....................................................
1348
A . The Law of the Lakes ...........................................
1350
B. The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources
Compact ...................................................
1354
II. HOW THE COMPACT FAILS TO PROTECT THE GREAT LAKES ..............
1357
A. The Fundamental Problem with the Proposed Compact ............
1357
Table 1. Impacts of Uses and Diversion on Lake Levels... 1359
B. The Problem of Out-of-Basin Diversions ..............................
1361
C. Protecting Upper W atersheds ......................................
1364
III. AN ALTERNATE FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING THE GREAT LAKES 1366
IV. THE ROAD TO AN ALTERNATE FRAMEWORK ..............................
1372
CON CLU SION ......................................................
1374
"A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure. It offers a necessity of
life that must be rationedamong those who have power over it. "
-Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, New Jersey v. New York'
INTRODUCTION

On December 13, 2005, the Governors and Premiers of the Great
Lakes states and provinces signed a Compact and Agreement designed to
honor the commitments made in the Great Lakes Charter Annex of 2001.2
* Professor of Law and Director, Natural Resources Law Center, University of
Colorado School of Law. I am grateful for the outstanding assistance provided by research
assistants Steven Odendahl and Stuart Gillespie in the preparation of this Article. I would
also like to thank Peter Annin and Noah Hall for their helpful comments and suggestions on
an earlier draft of this Article.
1. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
2. Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, Dec. 13,
2005, http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/12-13-05/GreatLakes-StLawrence River_
Basin WaterResourcesCompact.pdf [hereinafter 2005 Great Lakes Compact]; Great
Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement, Dec. 13, 2005,
http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/12-13-05/GreatLakes-StLawrenceRiver Basin
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The proposed Compact commits the parties to a rigorous program to regulate individual water uses, with citizen suits to enforce the requirements.'
The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact, as it is officially titled, has much to commend it. The parties established generally sound goals and followed an exemplary process that effectively engaged stakeholders. For example, when opposition began to build
on the Canadian side to the first set of documents, the parties pulled back
and renegotiated.4 Moreover, the regulation of individual water uses is long
overdue in some states, most notably Michigan, which is the only state that
is almost entirely within the Great Lakes Basin. Momentum is now building to ratify the Compact and obtain congressional approval.5 Despite its
positive aspects, those who care about the future of the Great Lakes must
urge policymakers to reject the current proposal and rethink the entire approach. The proposed Compact is a fundamentally flawed document that
will not achieve the ultimate stated goal of protecting and conserving the
water resources of the Great Lakes.
This Article briefly recounts the background of the law relating to the
water resources of the Great Lakes, with a particular focus on the recent
negotiations that led to development of the Compact.6 It then describes the
terms of the proposed Compact and its structural flaws and limitations.7
Finally, it suggests an alternate framework that is more likely to achieve the
important and widely-shared goals for promoting the sound management of
the water resources of the Great Lakes Basin.8
I.BACKGROUND

By almost any measure, the Great Lakes are an extraordinary natural
resource. Those who have studied issues involving the Lakes are familiar
with the statistics. They contain approximately twenty percent of the
SustainableWaterResourcesAgreement.pdf [hereinafter 2005 Great Lakes Agreement].
The focus of this Article is on the Compact, though much of the analysis applies equally to
the Agreement.
3. See 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 2, §§ 4.10-.1 1, 7.3.3.
4. Ontario refused to sign the initial draft of the Great Lakes Charter Annex on the
grounds that it permitted diversions. Margaret Philp, Won't Sign Great Lakes Water Deal,
Ontario Says, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto, Ont., Can.), Nov. 16, 2004, at A9. Nonetheless,
Ontario continued negotiations in order to gain veto power to block diversions. Id.
5. Indeed, the Ohio House voted on December 13, 2006 to pass the Great LakesSt. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact by a margin of 81-5. See H.B. 574,
126th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2006). However, the Compact "landed ... in the
Senate Rules Committee where unwanted bills sometimes die." Speculations Could Dry up
GreatLakes Water Accord, J. GAZETrE (Fort Wayne, Ind.), Dec. 15, 2006, at 3C.
6. See infra Part I.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
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world's fresh surface water and almost eighty-five percent of North America's fresh surface water. 9 Spread evenly across the continental United
States, the water would be nearly ten feet deep." The Great Lakes are
sometimes described as a non-renewable resource because less than one
percent of the Great Lakes is renewed each year." But one percent of the
Great Lakes is nearly sixty trillion gallons of water-more than thirteen
times the average annual flow of the Colorado River. 2
The states and provinces bordering the Great Lakes are home to more
than forty million people. 3 The Great Lakes shoreline extends over 10,000
miles and includes about 35,000 islands. 4 Due to their size, beauty, and
proximity to people, the Lakes offer outstanding recreational opportunities.
The eight Great Lakes States are home to approximately 3.7 million registered recreational boats, or almost one-third of the total registered recreational boats in the United States. 5 The Lakes also support a four billion
dollar commercial and sport fishing industry. 6 The Great Lakes are truly an
unparalleled natural and recreational treasure and their management should
reflect their incalculable value to society.

9. U.S.
EPA,
References
for
Great
Lakes
Statistics,
http://www.epa.gov/glnpo/statsrefs.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2007).
10. The Great Lakes Information Network, The Great Lakes, http://www.greatlakes.net/lakes/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2007).
11. See INT'L JOINT COMM'N, PROTECTION OF THE WATERS OF THE GREAT LAKES:
FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES 6 (2000),

http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/IJC2000Report.pdf [hereinafter IJC 2000 REPORT].
12. See David H. Getches, Competing Demands for the Colorado River, 56 U.
COLO. L. REV. 413, 419 (1985) (noting that "[d]ata spanning three centuries ... reveal an
average annual flow of... 13,500,000 acre-feet"). This is equivalent to an annual flow of
nearly 4.4 trillion gallons of water. Thirteen times this flow equals 57.2 trillion gallons.
The IJC 2000 Report notes that 162 billion gallons of water per day is renewable. See IJC
2000 REPORT, supra note 11, at 42. This is the equivalent of more than fifty-nine trillion
gallons of water.
13. IJC 2000 REPORT, supra note 11, at 6.
14. Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., About Our Great Lakes: Great Lakes
Basin Facts, http://www.glerl.noaa.gov/pr/ourlakes/facts.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2007);
Great Lakes Information Network, Islands in the Great Lakes Region, http://www.greatlakes.net/envt/air-land/isle.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2007).
15. Great Lakes Information Network, Great Lakes Fish & Fishing,
http://www.great-lakes.net/teach/envt/fish/fish_2.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2007).
16. About Our Great Lakes: Great Lakes Basin Facts, supra note 14. For more

information on the Great Lakes, see

PETER ANNIN, THE GREAT LAKES WATER WARS

(2006)

(reporting additional details about the Great Lakes and their remarkable assets and recounting at length the background and history of the negotiations that led to the adoption of the
Compact and agreement).
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A. The Law of the Lakes
The starting point for understanding the law of the Great Lakes is the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 (the "Treaty"). 17 The Treaty was designed
"to make provision for the adjustment and settlement" of past and future
disputes that might arise between Canada and the United States involving its
boundary waters. 8 Under the Treaty "questions or matters of difference"
may, by the consent of both parties, be referred to the International Joint
Commission (IJC), which is the agency established by the Treaty to administer its terms, either "for examination and report"'9 or "for decision."2 The
IJC consists of three commissioners from each country, and it may decide
matters referred to it by majority vote, or if it is unable to reach a decision,
by referral to "an umpire chosen in accordance with.., the Hague Convention.""1 The umpire is empowered to render a final decision.22 Although the
parties have referred matters to the IJC for examination and report,23 they
have never consented to an IJC referral to resolve a dispute. 4 Thus, while
the IJC has played an important role in promoting scientific understanding
of issues affecting the Great Lakes, its role has been largely advisory.
17. Boundary Waters Treaty, Jan. 11, 1909, United States-Great Britain, 36 Stat.
2248 (1909) (for Canada) [hereinafter 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty].
18. Id. proclamation, 36 Stat. at 2448.
19. Id. art. IX,36 Stat. at 2452.
20. Id. art. X, 36 Stat. at 2453.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. The United States and Canada first referred a matter to the IJC in 1912. Daniel
K. DeWitt, Great Words Neededfor the Great Lakes: Reasons to Rewrite the Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909, 69 IN. L.J. 299, 309 (1993). This referral related to international
concern over a waterborne typhoid endemic and resulted in a comprehensive report issued in
1918 calling for the construction of water treatment plants in urban areas. Id. The most
recent referral to the IJC occurred in 1998 in relation to a proposal by the Nova Group of
Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario to export bottled water. See Media Release, Int'l Joint Comm'n,
IJC Recommends Moratorium on Bulk Removals and Sales of Great Lakes Water (Aug. 18,
1999), http://www.ijc.org/rel/news/cde18081999e.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2007). This
resulted in the IJC 2000 Final Report on the Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes. See
IJC 2000 REPORT, supra note 11. For a more detailed account of referrals to the IJC, see
DeWitt, supra note 23, at 308-14.
24. Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in the GreatLakes Region, 77 U. COLO.L. REV. 405, 418 (2006).
25. Article X of the Treaty authorizes the United States and Canada to refer substantive matters to the Commission for decision, and if the Commission is equally divided, the
Commissioners must refer the matter to an umpire chosen in accordance with the Hague
Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes. 1909 Boundary Waters
Treaty art. X, supra note 17, 36 Stat. at 2453. The IJC has never exercised this authority,
however, because it has never received the referral from both countries that is required to
initiate the process. See Hall, supra note 24, at 418. For more information, see Dewitt,
supra note 23, at 308-14.
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The Treaty defines boundary waters in limited fashion to encompass
only those lakes and rivers along the international boundary, and specifically excludes tributaries to these waters.2" Under this definition, Lake
Michigan, which does not border any part of Canada, falls outside the scope
of the Treaty even though hydrologically it is considered to be part of the
same water body as Lake Huron, a major boundary water.27 Ironically,
perhaps, Lake Michigan has been the site of one of the most controversial
projects on the Great Lakes-the Chicago River diversion. This project,
which reversed the flow of the Chicago River away from Lake Michigan to
carry Chicago's sewage into the Mississippi River basin, has been the subject of numerous U.S. Supreme Court decisions.28 As a result of these cases,
the diversion of Lake Michigan water into the Chicago River is limited to
ninety cubic meters per second (cms) of water.29 To be sure, this is a substantial diversion that has a measurable impact on lake levels.30 Still, it is a
far cry from the peak diversions of 240 cms that Chicago reached in the
mid-1920s.3" Despite its importance to lake levels, the proposed Compact
effectively exempts the Chicago3 2 River diversion and offers no incentives to
promote its better management.
Complementing the work of the IJC is the Great Lakes Commission,
established under the original Great Lakes Basin Compact of 1968." 3 Like
the IJC, the Commission's role is essentially limited to gathering data and
making non-binding recommendations. In considering the prospects for the
proposed new Compact, it is instructive to consider that despite its limited
scope, it took nearly twenty years for Congress to approve the Great Lakes
Basin Compact. In 1955, the five states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Min26.

1909 Boundary Waters Treaty preliminary art., supra note 17, 36 Stat. at 2448-

49.
27. GREAT LAKES COMM'N FOR THE GREAT LAKES STATES & PROVINCES, TOWARD A
WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR THE GREAT LAKES-ST.
LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN 28 (2003), availableat http://www.glc.org/wateruse/wrmdss/final
report/pdfYWR-Ch.2-2003.pdf [hereinafter SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR THE GREAT LAKES].
28. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 449 U.S. 48 (1980); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S. 426
(1967); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 395 (1933); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 696
(1930); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179 (1930); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367
(1929). See also ANNN, supra note 16, at 85-109.
29. See Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 417 (1929); Sanitary Dist. of Chi. v.
United States, 266 U.S. 405, 413 (1925). This figure is often expressed in cubic feet per
second (cfs). Ninety cms equals 3,200 cfs.
30. See IJC 2000 REPORT, supra note 11, at 21, tbl.3 (showing a reduction in lake
levels for Lakes Huron and Michigan of six centimeters).
31. This is the equivalent of 8,500 cfs. See Wisconsin v. Illinois, 449 U.S. 48
(1980); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S. 426, 427 (1967); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 395
(1933).
32. See 2005 Great Lakes Agreement, supranote 2, art. 207(10).
33. See Great Lakes Basin Compact art. IV, Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414, 41516 (1968) [hereinafter 1968 Great Lakes Compact].
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nesota, and Wisconsin ratified the Compact. 34 Pennsylvania joined the following year, New York signed on in 1960, and Ohio ratified the Compact in
1963. 35 Congress did not finally consent to the Compact until 1968.36
The history of the current Compact negotiations begins with the Great
Lakes Charter of 1985." 7 This non-binding agreement among the eight
American states and two Canadian provinces within the Basin commits the
parties "to conserve the levels and flows of the Great Lakes and their tributary and connecting waters" and "to protect and conserve the environmental
balance of the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem."3 To achieve these goals, the
Charter sets forth five principles: (1) integrity of the Great Lakes Basin; (2)
cooperation among jurisdictions; (3) protection of the water resources of the
Great Lakes; (4) prior notice and consultation; and (5) cooperative programs
and practices. 39 The parties proposed to accomplish their goals by: collecting and maintaining a common database "regarding the location, type, and
quantities of water use, diversion, and consumptive use" 4° for all withdrawals in excess of 100,000 gallons per day; by regulating water withdrawals in
excess of two million gallons per day; and by providing prior notice and
consultation with the other parties on new diversions or consumptive uses in
excess of five million gallons per day. 41 Any party that fails to comply with
the Charter is not entitled to prior notice and consultation as set forth in the
Charter.42 This modest sanction has proved insufficient as an incentive to
the states and provinces to comply with the Charter's mandate.
In 2001, the parties agreed to an Annex to the 1985 Charter that reaffirms the Charter's five principles and further commits the parties to develop "an enhanced water management system that is simple, durable, efficient, retains and respects authority within the Basin, and, most importantly,
protects, conserves, restores, and improves" the water resources of the Great

34. See Univ. Wis.-Milwaukee, Great Lakes Comm'n, Records, 1955-65: Milwaukee Manuscript Collection CX, http://www.uwm.edu/Libraries/arch/findaids/msscx.htm (last
visited Apr. 2, 2007).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. The Great Lakes Charter: Principles for the Management of Great Lakes Water
Resources, Feb. 11, 1985, http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/GreatLakesCharter.pdf
[hereinafter 1985 Great Lakes Charter].
38. Id. at 1. Among the other purposes set forth in the Charter are "to provide for
cooperative programs and management of the water resources of the Great Lakes Basin... ;
to make secure and protect present developments within the region; and to provide a secure
foundation for future investment and development within the region." Id. at 1-2.
39. See id. at 2-3.
40. Id. at 3.
41. Id. at 6. See also ANNIN, supra note 16, at 72-75.
42. 1985 Great Lakes Charter, supranote 37, at 5-6.
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Lakes Basin.43 The Annex sets out six directives." First and foremost, it
provides for the preparation of a new set of Basin-wide, binding agreements
designed to achieve the Charter and Charter Annex goals.45 It commits the
parties to a broad-based public process.46 It directs the parties to establish a
"new decision making standard" to be used for new withdrawals.47 It commits the governors of the Great Lakes States to consult with the premiers of
the Great Lakes provinces pending finalization of the agreements.4" It requires the parties to "[d]evelop a decision support system that ensures [access to] the best available information" on the water resources of the Great
Lakes.49 Finally, it commits the parties to a series of additional measures
designed to help achieve the overall goals of the Charter and Annex.5
Before turning to the proposed Compact that resulted from the Charter
and Annex, one additional law must be noted. The Water Resources Development Act of 1986 (WRDA) is a remarkable piece of protectionist legislation that prohibits out-of-basin diversions of Great Lakes water without the
approval of the governors of all eight Great Lakes Basin states.5 While the
43. The Great Lakes Charter Annex: A Supplementary Agreement to the Great
Lakes Charter, June 18, 2001, http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/GreatLakesCharter
Annex.pdf [hereinafter 2001 Great Lakes Annex] (emphasis added).
44. See id.
45. Id. at 2 (setting forth Directive # 1).
46. Id. (setting forth Directive # 2).
47. Id. (setting forth Directive # 3).
48. Id. at 2-3 (setting forth Directive # 4).
49. Id. at 3 (setting forth Directive # 5).
50. Id. (setting forth Directive # 6).
51. Water Resource Development Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20 (2000). Peter
Annin quotes R. Timothy Wesson, an attorney from Pennsylvania who helped draft the Great
Lakes Charter, describing WRDA as an
abomination .... It's really one of the worst pieces of legislation created.... It
provides no due process, it provides no standards, [and] it creates an entirely political and unaccountable arrangement for casting vetoes-which is one of the silliest
ways for managing natural resources imaginable.
ANNIN, supra note 16, at 80-81. James Lochhead, a Denver attorney who prepared a report
for the Great Lakes governors in 1999, argued that the veto provision of WRDA violated the
Commerce Clause as well as perhaps the Due Process Clause and international trade laws.
See JAMES S. LOCHHEAD ET AL., REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF GREAT LAKES GOVERNORS:
GOVERNING THE WITHDRAWAL OF WATER FROM THE GREAT LAKES (1999); see also Sporhase
v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941 (1982) (striking down a Nebraska law denying a water right to an
out-of-state applicant on the grounds that it violated the Dormant Commerce Clause). The
Lochhead report's Commerce Clause analysis acknowledges that "congress can authorize
states to impose otherwise impermissible burdens on interstate commerce," but suggests that
WRDA lacks the express and unambiguous language required to uphold such authorizations.
Id. at 21, 22. The language in WRDA that authorizes diversions out of the Basin only when
approved by each of the Great Lakes States' governors is hardly ambiguous, however, and it
seems unlikely that a court would strike down WRDA on Commerce Clause grounds. See
W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981). Thus, while WRDA
may be "silly," it does not violate the Commerce Clause. As for the Due Process Clause, it
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policy arguments offered to support this law focus on the remote prospect
that Western states are looking to the Great Lakes to sate their desire for
new water supplies, 2 the law has proved most problematic for the Great
Lakes states themselves. 3 In particular, Michigan, which is the only state or
province almost entirely in the Basin and which cannot benefit from using
Great Lakes water outside the Basin, has shown a willingness to use WRDA
to trump the right of other Great Lakes states to provide modest drinking
water supplies for communities along the fringes of the Basin. 4 As explained below, while the proposed Compact makes a nod in the direction of
these "straddling communities," the restrictions on out-of-basin uses remain
extremely burdensome without any clear justification in terms of the benefits to water resource protection and conservation.
B. The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Compact
In its complexity and willingness to set mandatory, enforceable standards, the proposed Great Lakes Compact goes well beyond existing agreements. Unfortunately, its complexity is focused almost entirely on the trees
at the certain expense of the forest. Moreover, the Compact is neither simple nor efficient, and it commandeers the state regulatory process in a
heavy-handed manner that is wholly unnecessary to address the water resource issues presented by the Great Lakes. To understand the fundamental
nature of the problem with the proposed Compact, it is best to examine its

seems likely that any party whose water withdrawal is vetoed by a governor lacks a property
interest in the water sufficient to give rise to a procedural due process claim. See Bd. of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). See infra note 113 for a discussion of the possible
violations of trade laws.
52. See ANNIN, supra note 16, at 57-72.
53. Annin describes some of the many problems that particular communities in
Basin states very near to the Great Lakes have had acquiring water rights from the lakes. See
id, at 126-28 (discussing Pleasant Prairie, Wisconsin); see id. at 141-47 (discussing Lowell,
Indiana); see id. at 172-90 (discussing Akron, Ohio); see id. at 240-55 (discussing Wauskesha, Wisconsin).
54. As one commentator previously noted, "the governor of Michigan may unilaterally prohibit any other Great Lakes state from diverting water within its own borders, but
outside the basin, for any purpose, without fear of suffering any reciprocal consequences."
Mark J. Dinsmore, Comment, Like a Mirage in the Desert: Great Lakes Water Quantity
PreservationEfforts and Their Punitive Effects, 24 U. TOL. L. REv. 449, 468 (1993). Recently, Michigan Governor Jennifer Granholm used the State's veto power to prevent a proposed Great Lakes water diversion to Waukesha, Wisconsin, a city in a straddling county.
See Dan Egan, Wo Should Be Able to Tap GreatLakes?, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 17,
2006, at Al. Under the proposed Compact, Waukesha might qualify for a diversion under
the exemption for straddling counties, but in the past it has resisted a requirement that would
apply under the Compact to send its return flows back to the Basin. See ANNIN, supra note
16, at 240-55.
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requirements and match them against the underlying motives and objectives
that led the parties to come together in the first place.
As noted above, the proposed Compact is a complex document, but its
essential requirements break down rather easily into six parts. First, the
proposed Compact establishes inventory, registration and reporting requirements for all withdrawals in excess of 100,000 gallons per day, and for
any out-of-basin diversion.5 As already noted, similar data collection requirements were established in the original Charter but were never implemented or enforced.
Second, the proposed Compact prohibits new or increased diversions
out of the Basin, subject to limited exceptions. 6 The exceptions are for
"straddling communities," 57 "straddling counties," and for intra-basin transfers. 8 Numerous restrictions apply to such diversions. For straddling counties and communities, the waters may be used only for public water supplies, and all water withdrawn must be returned to the source watershed,
minus an allowance for consumptive use." In addition, all diversions that
result in a consumptive use in excess of five million gallons per day must
undergo a Regional Review process that includes review by all of the Great
Lakes states and provinces.6" Intra-basin diversions that exceed five million
gallons per day of consumptive use are subject to veto by a single member
of the Great Lakes Council-the body established to administer the pro55. See 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supranote 2, § 4.1.3.
56. See id. §§ 4.8-.9.
57. "Straddling community" is defined as "any incorporated city, town or the
equivalent thereof, wholly within any County that lies partly or completely within the Basin,
whose corporate boundary existing as of the effective date of this Compact, is partly within
the Basin or partly within two Great Lakes watersheds." Id. § 1.2.
58. Id. § 4.9.
59. Id. § 4.9.1(a). Intra-basin diversions are regulated only when they exceed
100,000 gallons per day. Id. § 4.9(2)(b).
60. Id. §§ 4.9.1(c), 4.9.2(c). Whether it is appropriate and lawful for the states to
delegate review authority to Canadian provinces is an interesting legal question beyond the
scope of this Article. The Great Lakes Basin Compact of 1968 provides valuable insight into
Congress' historical treatment of the Canadian provinces. When Congress approved the
Compact in 1968, it did not consent to the inclusion of Ontario and Quebec. Congress determined that the Great Lakes were of national interest and that the inclusion of the provinces
would interfere with the president's plenary authority to negotiate U.S. foreign policy. See
The Great Lakes Basin. Hearingon S. 2688 Before the S. Comm. on ForeignRelations, 84th
Cong. 83-87 (1956) (statement of Gilbert R. Johnson, Counsel, Lake Carriers Assoc., Cleveland, Ohio). Nonetheless, in a 1999 document described as a "Declaration of Partnership,"
Ontario and Quebec were accepted as "associate members" to the Great Lakes Commission.
Great Lakes Comm'n, Declaration of Partnership, http://www.glc.org/about/pdf/declarations
.pdf. Additionally, in 2000, Congress amended the Water Resource Development Act to
"encourage the Great Lakes States, in consultation with the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec, to develop and implement a mechanism that provides a common conservation standard..
." See Water Resources Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, § 504(a)(2), 114
Stat. 2572, 2644 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1962d-20(b)(2) (2000)).
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posed Compact." Diversions for straddling communities are subject to Regional Review and veto by a single Council member, regardless of their
size. 62 The Compact also effectively bans bulk water diversions in containers larger than 5.7 gallons.63
A third provision, and the heart of the Compact, concerns the obligation of each state to create a program for the management and regulation of
new or increased withdrawals within five years from the Compact's effective date.' 4 The parties themselves are allowed to set a threshold level for
regulation, subject to vague standards,65 but withdrawals that exceed the
threshold must meet a detailed decision making standard.66 Determining
whether the standard is met will seemingly require
the preparation of an
67
environmental impact statement or its equivalent.
Fourth, the parties commit to periodic cumulative impact assessments
at least every five years.68 This assessment is intended to inform the further
implementation of the Compact, but it lacks enforceable, substantive requirements.
Fifth, as noted above, the proposed Compact establishes a Council
comprised of the Governors of each state, with an alternate appointed to act
in the Governor's stead.69 The Council has broad powers to conduct research and collect data, conduct investigations, and institute court actions.70
The Council may also revise the standard of review and decision used for

61.
2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 2, § 4.9.2(c); see also id. § 2.1 (establishing the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Water Resources Council).
62. Id. § 4.9.3.
63. See id. § 4.12.10. The proposed Compact treats withdrawals in containers larger
than 5.7 gallons as proposals for diversion. Id. States are free to treat withdrawals in smaller
containers as they see fit. Id.
64. Id. § 4.10.1.
65. Under section 4.10.1, the standard must be set "to assure an effective and efficient Water management program that will ensure that uses overall are reasonable, that
Withdrawals overall will not result in significant impacts ... and that all other objectives of
the Compact are achieved." Id.
66. Any party that fails to set a threshold standard within ten years from the effective date of the Compact is required to use a 100,000 gallon per day threshold. Id. § 4.10.2.
67. Under section 4.11, all water withdrawn must be returned to the source, less an
allowance for consumption. Id. § 4.11. 1. In addition, the withdrawal must be implemented
"to ensure ... no significant individual or cumulative adverse impacts ... ; to incorporate
Environmentally Sound and Economically Feasible Water Conservation Measures... ; [and]
to ensure ... compliance with all applicable ... laws...." Id. § 4.11.2-.4. In addition, the
reasonableness of the use must be determined based on six factors that reflect concerns about
efficiency, water supply, economic development, environmental protection, and adverse
impacts to the Basin. See id. § 4.11.5.
68. 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 2, § 4.15.1.
69. See id. §§ 2.1-.3.
70. See id. § 3.2.
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making individual water allocation decisions and for determining exceptions to the prohibition on diversions. 7'
Finally, the proposed Compact includes provisions for public participation and dispute resolution.72 Most notably, it grants aggrieved persons
the right to a hearing in accordance with state administrative laws, and it
provides for judicial review of adverse administrative decisions. 73 The proposed Compact also includes a "citizen suit" provision that authorizes actions against the Council or any party to compel compliance with the Compact, and it provides for recovery of attorneys fees to prevailing parties.74
Beyond these specific requirements, the proposed Compact adopts one
other important innovation. While ground and surface water are managed
separately in most jurisdictions throughout the United States, the proposed
Compact simply defines "water" to mean "ground or surface water contained within the Basin. '75 Because of the interconnectedness of water resources this provision makes good sense.
II. How THE COMPACT FAILS TO PROTECT THE GREAT LAKES
A. The Fundamental Problem with the Proposed Compact
Before describing the fundamental problem with the proposed Compact, it is necessary to look back at the core motives that led to its development. While it may be appropriate to ascribe protectionism as at least one
underlying reason for the proposed Compact, the professed and most prominent reason for the effort was a sincere desire to protect the ecological values inherent in the water resources of the Great Lakes. Evidence of this
comes from both the original 1985 Charter and the 2001 Annex. 76 As noted
previously, the key reasons for the Charter were "to conserve the levels and
71. Id. §§ 3.1-.2.
72. See id. §§ 6.1-.2, 7.2.
73. Id. § 7.3.
74. While the language somewhat tracks citizen suit provisions in federal environmental laws, see, e.g., Clean Air Act § 304(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2000), it is somewhat
different in expressly authorizing recovery of fees by prevailing parties. Given the express
limitation on the recovery of fees to prevailing parties, it is odd that the language does not
clearly allow only "one-way" fee shifting, making clear that, as a general rule, only prevailing plaintiffs are eligible to recover their fees. See generally David Berger, PrevailingParty
Concepts in Court Awards of Attorneys' Fees, in COURT AWARDS OF ATTORNEYS' FEES:
LITIGATING ANTITRUST CIVIL RIGHTS, PUBLIC INTEREST AND SECURITIES CASES 41 (PLI Litig.
& Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 324, 1987).
75. 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 2, § 1.2. The Regulated Riparian Model
Water Code similarly treats all water sources the same for purposes of management and
regulation.
See AM. SOC'Y OF CIVIL ENG'RS,
REGULATED RIPARIAN MODEL WATER CODE (2004).

76.

ASCE/EWRI STANDARD No. 40-03,

See 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supranote 2, § 1.3.
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flows of the Great Lakes and their tributary and connecting waters... [and]
to protect and conserve the environmental balance of the Great
Lakes .... "7 7 The Annex commits the parties to develop "an enhanced water management system that is simple, durable, efficient, retains and respects authority within the Basin, and, most importantly, protects, conserves, restores, and improves the Waters and Water-Dependent Natural
Resources of the Great Lakes Basin.""8
The proposed Compact can thus be fairly assessed in terms of whether
it achieves these overarching goals. Sadly, it does not. Despite many positive aspects to the proposal, it utterly fails to promote the ecological health
of the Basin and its water and water dependent resources. The key feature
of the proposed Compact is its requirement that states manage new or increased withdrawals and assess them against a specific decision-making
standard. For many reasons, this cumbersome requirement is unlikely to
achieve any progress toward protecting lake levels and promoting the ecological health in the Basin. Most importantly, by focusing so much attention on new or increased withdrawals, the proposed Compact ignores all of
the far more significant existing uses and activities that currently affect the
water resources of the Great Lakes Basin. In a report published in 2000, the
IJC described how existing uses currently impact the Great Lakes.79 That
impact, which is summarized in the table below, illustrates how insignificant the new or increased withdrawals are likely to be on the water resources of the Great Lakes for many years to come.

77.
1985 Great Lakes Charter, supra note 37, at 1.
78. 2001 Great Lakes Annex, supra note 43, at 1.
79. See IJC 2000 REPORT, supra note 11. The IJC's 2000 Report resulted from a
referral by the Canadian and American governments following the controversy over the
Nova Group's proposal to ship bulk water from Lake Superior to Asia. ANNIN, supra note
16, at 196-97.
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Table 1. Impacts of Uses and Diversion on Lake Levels8"
Divesion
Diversion/
Modification

(c
Michigan
Rate superio
Huron/
(s
(cm)
(cm)
(cm)

Long Lac-Ogoki 81
Chicago River8 2
Welland Canal83
St. Clair/Detroit
84
River Dredging

160
91
266

+6.4

+11.3

-2.1

-6.4

-4.3

-3

-1.8

-5.5

-13.4

0.00

NA

0.00

-80

0.00

0.00

Niagara River Outlet

NA
NA

0.00
-1

+3
-5

+12
-4

NA
-6

NA

+1.50

-82.6

-2.1

-2.3

AH consumptive uses

Erie
(cm)
+7.6

Ontario
(cm)
+6.7

(as of 1993)
Totals

80.

Data adapted primarily from INT'L JOINT COMM'N, GREAT LAKES DIVERSIONS
(1985), available at http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/pdf/ID586
.pdf [hereinafter IJC 1985 REPORT], and the IJC 2000 REPORT, supra note 11. The figure for
the St. Clair and Detroit River dredging comes from W.F. BAIRD & ASSOc., REGIME CHANGE
AND CONSUMPTIVE USES

(MAN MADE INTERVENTION) AND ONGOING EROSION IN THE ST. CLAIR RIVER AND IMPACTS ON

LAKE MICHIGAN-HURON LAKE LEVELS (2005), available at http://www.georgianbay.ca/pdf/
water-levels/St.ClairReportV5.pdf [hereinafter REGIME CHANGE]. Even accepting that
some uncertainty exists regarding the accuracy of these figures, they plainly illustrate the
importance of these activities for the overall health of the Great Lakes Basin.
81. Long Lac and Ogoki are two separate diversions that take water that originally
drained into James Bay and divert it into Lake Superior. IJC 1985 REPORT, supra note 80, at
10. The primary purpose of these diversions was for hydroelectric power generation, but
Long Lac has also been used to transport pulpwood. Id. These diversions are governed by
the Niagara River Water Diversion Treaty of 1950 between the U.S and Canada. Id. See
generally id. at 10-15.
82. As previously noted, the Chicago diversion, which reverses the flow of the Chicago River out of Lake Michigan and into the Mississippi River Basin, was primarily designed to treat sewage but it is also used for municipal water supplies, power generation, and
navigation. See supra text accompanying notes 28-32; see also IJC 1985 REPORT, supranote
80, at 15-16.
83. The Welland Canal takes water from Lake Erie and allows ships to bypass the
Niagara River and Niagara Falls. IJC 1985 REPORT, supra note 80, at 16. It is also used by
Ontario for hydroelectric power generation. Id. See generally id. at 16-20.
84. Dredging records indicate that between 1841 and 1992, approximately twentytwo million cubic meters of material have been removed from the St. Clair River, primarily
to promote navigation. REGIME CHANGE, supra note 80, at 25. The impacts of dredging on
the St. Clair River are a matter of some dispute. In 1987, the IJC estimated the impact on
Lake Huron to be between negative thirty-six and negative forty-three centimeters, but a
recent study by W.F. Baird and Associates puts this figure at approximately eighty centimeters. Id.
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The table illustrates two important points. First, several existing projects have impacts on lake levels that far exceed the impacts from all of the
existing consumptive uses from all of the states and provinces through
1993. Most strikingly, the dredging of the St. Clair and Detroit Rivers alone
has an impact on Lakes Michigan and Huron that is more than fifteen times
the impact of all the existing consumptive uses for those bodies of water.
Second, all of the existing consumptive uses have a comparatively minor
impact on lake levels when compared with the other diversions and projects
described in the table. Of course, the proposed Compact will not address
any of the uses or projects on the table, since it focuses almost exclusively
on new consumptive uses. 5 But a Compact that addresses only new withdrawals-indeed, new withdrawals that occur after the deadline for establishing a regulatory program, which is five years from the Compact's effective date-and that ignores existing withdrawals and other uses and activities that significantly impact lake levels cannot hope to achieve the ecological health goals that are set forth in the Charter and Annex.
Beyond the goal of protecting and conserving the waters of the Great
Lakes Basin, the Annex mandates a solution that is "simple, durable, efficient, [and] retains and respects authority within the Basin .... "6 But the
highly specific standards for evaluating new withdrawal applications cannot
be simply applied, and the complex assessment that the Compact requires
states to make to ascertain compliance with the standards cannot be done
efficiently. Most importantly though, the "command and control""7 directive to regulate new water withdrawals pursuant to detailed criteria does not
respect state authority. Even assuming that consideration of the cumulative
impact of consumptive uses might be necessary to protect and conserve the
water resources of the Great Lakes Basin, the rigid system imposed under
the Compact on every state for new water uses is certainly not the only, and
arguably not the best way, to conserve water resources. For example, rather
than regulating new uses strictly, some states might prefer to relax their
85. Professor Hall has argued that the proposed Compact does not grandfather existing uses since states remain free to address these uses of their own accord. See Hall, supra
note 24, at 436. While it is true that states remain free to impose regulations that go beyond
the terms of the Compact, the Compact itself fails to require regulation of existing uses. An
analogous situation exists under the Clean Air Act, which requires states to regulate new
stationary sources of pollution but generally lets states decide whether and how to regulate
existing sources. With respect to these sources, commentators frequently describe existing
sources as having been grandfathered. See, e.g., Victor B. Flatt & Kim Diana Connolly,
'Grandfathered'Air PollutionSources andPollution Control: New Source Review Under the
Clean Air Act, (Center for Progressive Regulation, CPR White Paper No. 504, 2005), available at http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/NSR 504.pdf.
86. 2001 Great Lakes Annex, supra note 43, at 1.
87. "Command and control" is a phrase used to describe specific regulatory standards established and enforced by a central authority with limited flexibility to meet unique
situations.
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standards on new uses and regulate existing uses modestly to achieve even
better conservation overall than provided for under the Compact. Moreover, because the Compact imposes no firm cap on overall use of the water
resources of the Basin, the potential for overuse under the Compact model
remains.8 8 Indeed, because the equitable position of the parties favors increasing their use as against each other,89 one would expect the Compact to
promote, rather than restrain, consumption of water resources, notwithstanding the detailed process for approving consumptive uses. If the parties are
truly committed to respecting state authority, and if the most important
thing is to protect the water resources of the Great Lakes, then states and
provinces should be free to adopt any plan that achieves an appropriate level
of water conservation.
B. The Problem of Out-of-Basin Diversions9"
In the spring of 1998, the Nova Group based in Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario proposed annual shipments by tanker of 160 million gallons of Lake

88. The risk of overuse is not hypothetical. In The Great Lakes Water Wars, Peter
Annin describes an irrigation project approved by Governor John Engler in 1993 for the Mud
Creek Irrigation District. See ANNiN, supra note 16, at 154-67. The project was designed to
withdraw an average of 8.6 million gallons per day from Saginaw Bay in Lake Huron
through Mud Creek to provide irrigation water for farms in the "thumb" area of Michigan.
Id. at 156, 159. The decision to approve this project was made over the strenuous objections
of the Great Lakes states and provinces, who were provided notice and a right of consultation
under the terms of the Great Lakes Charter. Id. at 163-64. Ironically, Governor Engler's
recommendation to approve this project came one year to the day after Governor Engler
vetoed a much more modest proposal to withdraw about one million gallons per day from the
Great Lakes for the small community of Lowell, Michigan. Id. at 163. Despite significant
federal subsidies the Mud Creek project proved to be an abysmal failure, and only a tiny
fraction of the water allocated for the project is actually withdrawn today. Id. at 167-68.
Still, Mud Creek illustrates the potential for overuse and like the Great Lakes Charter, the
Compact only requires prior notice before large in-basin uses are approved.
89. In Nebraska v. Wyoming, the Supreme Court described its approach to apportionment in a case involving three prior appropriation states:
Apportionment calls for the exercise of an informed judgment on a consideration
of many factors. Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But physical
and climatic conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sections of the
river, the character and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the
availability of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream
areas, the damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a limitation is imposed on the former-these are all relevant factors.
325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945).
90. Although the word "diversion" is used in most Western states simply to define a
withdrawal of water, the proposed Compact defines "diversion" as "a transfer of Water from
the Basin into another watershed, or from the watershed of one of the Great Lakes into that
of another by any means of transfer...." 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 2, § 1.2.
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Superior water to Asia.9 Although Ontario initially approved the proposal,
the province quickly reversed course after a public outcry against it.92 More
importantly, the proposal prompted renewed efforts by the Great Lakes
states and provinces to revisit the Great Lakes Charter. The 2001 Annex
and the proposed Compact that followed are a direct result of those efforts.93
Long before Nova's proposal, however, the parties wrestled with the
problem of out-of-basin diversions.94 The Water Resources Development
Act of 1986 effectively blocked most new out-of-basin diversions, and despite the problems this legislation created for some communities located
within Basin states but outside the Basin, a substantial constituency developed to fortify the ban on most diversions.
The proposed Compact imposes a strict ban on new diversions that in
some respects goes beyond the provisions of WRDA. Whereas WRDA
allowed diversions so long as every Great Lakes governor approved them,
the proposed Compact bans all diversions except in narrow circumstances.95
As noted previously, limited exceptions are authorized for straddling communities and straddling counties,96 as well as for intra-basin transfers.97 In

particular, out-of-basin diversions are allowed only for public water supplies, and any water withdrawn from the Basin must be returned to the
source watershed less an allowance for consumptive use. Moreover, a single state can veto any diversion proposed by straddling counties as well as
large intra-basin diversions. Parties must submit to a Regional Review for
these large diversions as well that includes all of the Great Lakes states and
provinces.98
91. IJC 2000 REPORT, supra note 11, at 44; see also ANNIN, supra note 16, at 19397; Mark Squillace & Sandra Zellmer, ManagingInterjurisdictionalWaters under the Great
Lakes CharterAnnex, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENv'T 8 (2003).
92. See Martin O'Malley & Angela Mulholland, Canada's Water, CBC NEWS
ONLiNE, availableat http://www.portaec.net/library/ocean/water/canadas -water.html.
93. See Great Lakes Restoration:HearingBefore the S. Comm. on Environmental &
Public Works, 108th Cong. 74-77 (2003) (testimony of Samuel W. Speck, Chair, Council of
Great Lakes Governors Water Management Working Group), http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_
statements.cfm?id=2 12798 (last visited Apr. 2, 2007).
94. See ANNIN, supra note 16, at 57-72 (describing a number of major transbasin
diversion proposals, some of which involved the Great Lakes, that have never come even
close to being approved).
95. See 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 2, § 4.8.
96. See id. §§ 4.9.1, 4.9.3. See supra text accompanying note 59.
97. 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 2, § 4.9.2.
98. See id. at § 4.5; see also supra Part I.B. (describing the limits on diversions).
While the findings of the Regional Review body are not binding on the Council (which includes only state representatives), see 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 2, § 4.5.5(i)
(stating that "the Council shall consider the Declaration of Finding before making a decision
on the Proposal"), the process is structured to promote consensus decision-making by the
review body itself. Whether an interstate Compact can lawfully commit the states to a process involving two foreign provinces is an interesting constitutional issue that is beyond the
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While it is surely important to prevent massive out-of-basin diversions
that can directly impact water levels of the lakes, such as the Chicago River
Diversion, it is far from clear that the states or provinces should have any
control over diversions that fail to impact them in any measurable way.
Why, for example, should Michigan or Ohio have any role to play in a proposal by Quebec or New York to divert water out of the St. Lawrence Seaway? Why too, should any state or province be allowed to object if another
state or province prefers to judiciously use some of its fair share of Great
Lakes water for an out-of-basin purpose? Under the proposed Compact,
states may not object to another state's overuse of Great Lakes water resources so long as those uses are in the Basin and the state follows the
Compact's procedures for approving their use. Yet over the long term, such
uses could have a far greater impact on the Great Lakes and the balance of
uses among the states and provinces than any out-of-basin diversion.99 In
other words, the Compact focuses too much on the place of the use, rather
than on the impact of the use on the overall water resources in the Basin.
By severely limiting use of Great Lakes water out of the Basin, the
proposed Compact also indirectly promotes extractions within smaller watersheds and groundwater basins, where the potential for ecological damage
may be far more severe.' 0 For example, a community outside the Basin that
fails to qualify as a straddling community or county faces an outright ban on
Great Lakes water use.'' Yet the Compact fails to reveal even the slightest
recognition that withdrawals from a local watershed or groundwater basin
could have a significant local ecological impact, whereas the use of Great
Lakes water in the same amount might well be negligible. This problem
could arise even with straddling communities and counties, since the proposed Compact provides significant disincentives to such communities that
might want to withdraw Great Lakes water, including requirements to conduct an alternatives analysis, undergo regional review, and return water to
scope of this Article. See Chris A. Shafer, Great Lakes Diversions Revisited: Legal Constraintsand Opportunitiesfor State Regulation, 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REv. 461 (2000).
99. The often expressed objection about past proposals to divert modest amounts of
water out of the Basin center on the precedent that they might set. See generally ANNIN,
supra note 16. Annin refers to the concern about precedent both with the Nova Group proposal, see id. at 195, and the Waukesha proposal, see id. at 244. In particular, Annin notes
that "a hundred Waukeshas would nearly equal the Illinois diversion." Id. But precedent
would not be a legitimate worry if states were required to limit their consumption to their fair
share and if the Compact provided for management of overall water use within the Basin as
proposed in the alternate framework. See infra Part III.
100. Officials in Waukesha, Wisconsin argued, for example, that the local Fox River
watershed and the marsh that it supported were far more threatened by the loss of the city's
return flows than was Lake Michigan, where the impact would have been negligible. See
ANNIN, supra note 16, at 252. Yet the states refused to budge on their demand that Waukesha send its return flows back to the Basin. Id.
101.
See 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 2, §§ 4.8-.9.
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the source watershed after use. 0 2 It is entirely appropriate that the proposed
Compact considers the ecological health of the Great Lakes, but it is wrong
to essentially ignore the broader ecological impact on the affected region, as
the proposed Compact does. Indeed, because the local watersheds adjacent
to the Great Lakes Basin will necessarily be much smaller, the potential for
ecological harm to these adjacent watersheds from withdrawing a fixed
amount of water is far higher." 3
C. Protecting Upper Watersheds
Under the proposed Compact, the states and provinces are required to
ensure that "Withdrawals overall will not result in impacts to the Waters
and Water Dependent Natural Resources of the Basin, determined on the
basis of significant impacts to the physical, chemical, and biological integrity of Source Watersheds .... .""o In addition, withdrawals and consumptive uses must be implemented "so as to ensure that the Proposal will result
in no significant individual or cumulative adverse impacts to the quantity or
quality of the Waters and Water Dependent Natural Resources .... '""
While these provisions could, and perhaps should, be construed to restrict
proposals to remove waters from upper watersheds, they are certainly not
framed in those terms, and they are worded so generally that they will be
easy to circumvent. As previously argued, 6 the proposed Compact is fairly
criticized for being unduly intrusive on state authority without a commensurate benefit. Yet, the one place where intrusion on state authority may make
sense is for such upper watershed withdrawals. Anecdotal evidence from

102. See id. at §4.9.
103. In The GreatLakes Water Wars, Peter Annin describes how Waukesha, Wisconsin, a city in a straddling county, argued for the right to divert Lake Michigan water but not
return it to the Basin because of the adverse impacts on the Fox River ecosystem. ANNIN,
supra note 16, at 240-55. Waukesha's request was ultimately denied. See James Rowen,
New Water Diversion Try Shows Problems Ahead, WISOPINION.COM, July 3, 2006,
http://www.wisopinion.com/index.iml?mdl=article.mdl&article=4590 (last visited Apr. 2,
2007). Waukesha now plans to drill two new wells to tap its shallow aquifer to meet its
water needs. Don Behm, Area Aquifer Projectedto Drop 125 Feet by 2020, MILWAUKEE J.
SENTINEL, May 22, 2004, at lB. This could adversely impact surface water levels. Id. A
somewhat different issue confronts New Berlin, Wisconsin, which relies heavily on a deep
aquifer to supply its municipal water system. Radium contamination in its wells recently led
New Berlin to request a new water diversion from the Great Lakes, which would allow the
town to limit the drawdown in the aquifer. Egan, supra note 54. Although New Berlin is a
straddling community, it has faced significant opposition for this withdrawal, even though all
of the water would be returned to the Basin and the diversion would protect the New Berlin
aquifer. See id
104. 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 2, § 4.10.1.
105. Id. § 4.11.2.
106. See supra Part II.
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recent water supply controversies suggests that this is really where the ecological problems are most likely to occur.
For example, several years ago the Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation sued Nestld Waters North America for pumping water to a water
bottling plant in western Michigan." 7 The well from which the water was
extracted was hydrologically connected to Sanctuary Springs, which connects to the headwaters of the West Branch of the Little Muskegon River. 8
The trial court found that the water resources below the pumping site were
impaired at pumping rates above 160-170 gallons per minute. 9 Nestl6
wanted to pump at an average rate of 250 gallons per minute, or 360,000
gallons per day."' The difference-about ninety gallons per minute, or
129,600 gallons per day-is, by most measures, a small amount of water."'
If this water had been taken directly from one of the Great Lakes or from an
aquifer directly connected to one of the Lakes, the impact would have been
negligible. By taking the water from the upper watershed of a small tributary, however, the withdrawal may well have a significant ecological impact."' The proposed Compact would do much more to protect the ecological health of the Great Lakes if it had focused on banning upper watershed
107. Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestl6 Waters N. Am. Inc. (Nestld I),
No. 01-14563-CE (49th Jud. Cir. Mich. Nov. 25, 2003), available at
http://www.envlaw.com/decisions/MCWC%20decision.pdf. See Welcome to the Michigan
Citizens for Water Conservation Web Site!, http://www.savemiwater.org/MAIN%20PAGES/
watercourt%20case.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2007). For other examples of anecdoctal evidence from other water supply controversies, see also Town Wants to Suck Lake Michigan
Dry with Straws, CHICAGOIST, Nov. 28, 2006, http://www.chicagoist.com/archives/2006/11/

28/town wants to suck lake michigandrywith straws.php (last visited Apr. 2, 2007);
Felicity Barringer, Growth Stirs a Battle to Draw More Water from the Great Lakes, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 12, 2005, at A12.
108. Nestlg I, No. 01-14563-CE, slip op. at 5, 12.
109. Mich. Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestld Waters N. Am. Inc. (Nestl6 II),
709 N.W.2d 174, 188 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).
110. Id.atl86n.16.
111.
In the western states, for example, a common allocation for irrigation purposes is
one cubic foot per second of water, or 646,317 gallons per day, to irrigate seventy acres of
land. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-317 (2006). Thus, one would need almost twice the
water produced by Nestle at this facility to irrigate seventy acres of land in Wyoming. Likewise, in the United States, per capita use of public water supplies in 1990 averaged 183 gallons per day. See EPA, How We Use Water in These United States, available at
http://esa21.kennesaw.edu/activities/water-use/water-use-overview-epa.pdf.
Based on this
statistic, the Nestld water bottling facility produces enough water to satisfy the needs of
about 8,000 people.
112. See generally ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND
THE FATE OF AMERICA'S FRESH WATERS (2002). Glennon describes the adverse ecological

effects of a proposed Perrier water bottling plant near the headwaters of the Mecan River in
Wisconsin-an outstanding trout fishery. See id. at 4-9. Perrier ultimately abandoned this
project. Meg Jones, PerrierGives up Plan to Tap Mecan River, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
Feb. 26, 2000, at lB.
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withdrawals rather than out-of-basin diversions." 3 Yet it lacks any specific
limit on such uses.
III. AN ALTERNATE FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING THE GREAT LAKES

If the focus of the Compact were truly on managing the Basin's water
resources to protect its ecological health, then the states and provinces
should design a management framework that addresses the large withdrawals, uses, and activities that either individually or cumulatively have a meaningful impact on lake or tributary stream levels." 4 These should include
activities such as the dredging of the St. Clair River, the operation of the
Welland Canal, the Chicago River diversion, and the Long Lac and Lake
Okogi diversions. While it may be politically and practically impossible to
significantly alter these activities, the proposed Compact could give ownership of these activities to the host state or province in a way that would promote their better management.

113. Beyond the ecological threat posed by withdrawing water from an upperwatershed, a number of legal questions arise under NAFTA, GATT, and the WTO. Of
particular concern for the proposed Compact is the question whether these free-trade agreements might trump the Compact's ban on water exports. To the extent the proposed Compact actually focuses on the overall ecological health of the Great Lakes and the conservation
of exhaustible water resources, it should not pose a free trade problem. Article XX of GATT
provides that trade can be restricted "relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective ... with restrictions on domestic production or
consumption." General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194, 262-64. The proposed Compact, however, does not impose restrictions
on domestic production or consumption. Rather, it merely requires that withdrawals be
managed subject to certain standards. By contrast, the proposed alternate framework, see
infra Part III, would clearly limit production and consumption based upon allocations that are
established to protect the ecological health of the Basin. A more detailed analysis of the free
trade issues is included in section 8 of the IJC 2000 REPORT, supra note 11, at 32-34. The
Appellate Body's 1998 ruling in Shrimp/Turtle offers an example of a favorable ruling for
the conservation of a natural resource under Article XX of GATT. See Robert Howse, The
Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baselinefor the Trade and
Environment Debate, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 489, 519 (2002).
114. Some of the Great Lakes states may resist any solutions that move them too far
away from their riparian law roots. Yet the proposed Compact itself bears little resemblance
to traditional riparian principles. New withdrawals and consumptive uses that exceed the
threshold levels must meet stringent standards that go well beyond the correlative rights
principles of riparian doctrine. See 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supra note 2, § 4.11. Some
might argue that the strict limits on out-of-basin uses reflect a riparian law preference for
using water within the local watershed, but water uses on nonriparian lands, whether in or
out of the Basin, have become fairly commonplace in riparian jurisdictions and are reflected
in modem riparian laws. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 373.223(2) (2006) (recognizing the right of
the regulating agency to authorize the use of water "outside the watershed from which it is
taken").
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Many years ago, Justice Holmes noted that "[a river] offers a necessity
of life that must be rationed among those who have power over it.",' 5 In
keeping with this advice, the parties should allocate the water resources of
the Great Lakes Basin based upon current levels of use. Unlike the proposed Compact, such a framework would, in the words of the Charter Annex, offer a solution that is "simple, durable, [and] efficient" that "retains
and respects authority within the Basin" and that "protects, conserves, restores, and improves the Waters and Water-Dependent Natural Resources of
the Great Lakes Basin. 116 Here is how it might work.
First, the parties will have to agree to be bound by a water budget that
will most likely be based upon an agreed percentage of the historical use of
water resources by each of the states and provinces." 7 The International
Joint Commission has already compiled figures for percentage use among
the states and provinces and this information provides a ready basis for negotiations. Using comprehensive data from 1993, the IJC developed a reliable snapshot of water usage by jurisdiction. The IJC determined that consumptive use in Ontario was twenty-seven percent; in Michigan, twenty-one
percent; in Wisconsin, twenty percent; in Indiana, seven percent; in New
York, Quebec, and Ohio, six percent each; in Illinois, four percent; in Minnesota, two percent; and in Pennsylvania, less than one percent. "8 While
additional work might need to be done to verify these figures and to further
delineate usage within appropriate sub-basins, the use of historical data to
establish baseline percentages will avoid the risk that states will inflate their
water usage to increase their rights under the proposed alternate framework.
This would be the first contribution of a water budget towards conserving
the water resources of the Great Lakes. 9
Second, the parties will have to cede oversight responsibility to a central authority, perhaps the IJC itself, including the power to determine how
much water is available for consumptive use during an established water
cycle. Because of the relative insignificance of downstream withdrawals to
115. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
116. 2001 Great Lakes Annex, supra note 43, at 1.
117. The notion of a water budget may seem like unfamiliar territory for riparian
states. Western prior appropriation states are probably more comfortable with fixed allocations of water. But the permit system required by the proposed Compact is designed to set
fixed allocations for individual users, and the water budget merely represents an aggregation
of present and future fixed uses.
118. IJC 2000 REPORT, supra note 11, at 10, fig. 2-C.
119. The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact uses a water budget similar to the
one proposed here. In order meet their legal obligation to deliver 7.5 million acre feet to the
Lower Colorado River Basin, the five upper-basin states apportioned the flow of the river on
a percentage basis. See Upper Colorado River Compact art. III, Pub. L. No. 81-37, Apr. 6,
1949, 63 Stat. 31, 32-33. Special allocations might be made for the truly big diversions or
activities that affect water levels in the Basin so that their management and control can be
carefully monitored.
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upstream users, the IJC might appropriately look to hydrologic sub-basins in
defining state and provincial rights. 2 ' Also, because the Basin is blessed
with such vast water resources, it is unlikely, at least initially, that these
water budgets will be especially stringent. Nonetheless, the central authority should be required to follow the "precautionary principle"'21 and "take
into account the best available data, information, and knowledge, including
cultural, economic, environmental, and social values"'22 when establishing
the overall budget. This will ensure an allocation that balances the Basin's
essential water needs with its overall ecological health. As time goes on
and more is learned about the role of water resources to the ecology of the
Basin, these budgets may have to be tightened. Unlike the program established under the proposed Compact though, the alternate framework suggested here will teach states and provinces how to manage overall water
consumption and use, and it is readily adaptable to address cyclical problems such as drought and possible impacts from climate change.
Third, the parties will have to accurately report their water consumption and use to the central authority. A common, reliable data collection
system could be modeled along the lines of the system set forth in the proposed Compact. That system requires each party to "develop and maintain
a Water resource inventory for the collection, interpretation, storage, retrieval exchange, and dissemination of information . . . [on] the location,
type, and quantity of Withdrawals, Diversions and Consumptive Uses."' 23 It
further requires the Council to "assist each Party to develop a common base
of data"'24 and to register withdrawals in excess of 100,000 gallons per
day.'25 Finally, it requires each party to report annually on the monthly volumes of withdrawals, consumptive uses, and diversions.'26 It must be
stressed, however, that under the proposed alternate framework, the reliability and transparency of the data and its timely collection will be critical to
the success of the program. All parties, as well as the general public, must
have a high level of confidence in this data. With this in mind, the parties
120. The IJC refers to the Great Lakes as a "single hydrologic system" in its 2000
final report. lJC 2000 REPORT, supra note 11, at 31. While cumulative impacts should be
evaluated with respect to the overall Great Lakes ecosystem, individual impacts might be
considered in relation to their immediate impact on a sub-basin. See IJC 2000 REPORT, supra
note 11.
121. The European Environmental Agency has written a paper that describes the
precautionary principle and that is instructive in its application. See EUR. ENV'T AGENCY,
ENVTL ISSUE REP. No. 22, LATE LESSONS FROM EARLY WARNINGS: THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE 1896-2000 (Poul Harremoes ed., 2001), availableat http://reports.eea.europa.eu/
environmentalissuereport 2001_22/en/Issue Report No 22.pdf.
122. IJC 2000 REPORT, supra note 11, at 46.
123. 2005 Great Lakes Compact, supranote 2, § 4.1.1.
124. Id. § 4.1.2.
125. See id. § 4.1.3.
126. See id. § 4.1.4.
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should develop a common website for reporting water data. This website
should be accessible to all parties as well as the general public and should
allow for the receipt of comments and questions relating to the reported
data. In this way, issues regarding the reliability of the data can be quickly
identified and resolved.
To enforce the allocated water budget, the central authority will also
have to monitor and audit water use and impose financial or other penalties
against parties that violate their budgets. For example, the alternate framework might establish a schedule of fines or fees of a set amount for every
million gallons of water in excess of the party's allocation.'27 In the alternative, penalties might be assessed against a state's future allocation.
While this alternate framework is simple, efficient, and respectful of
state authority, its most important advantage over the proposed Compact is
that it allows the parties to truly focus on protecting the ecological integrity
of the Great Lakes Basin. If, for example, the health of the Basin were
threatened by drought, adjustments to water budgets could be quickly made,
as necessary, to protect the Basin's resources.
Because of the relative abundance of water in the Great Lakes, at least
one commentator has suggested that a water budget is not needed for the
Great Lakes.'28 But if water scarcity were not a concern, then the strenuous
objections to the Nova Group proposal'29 and other proposals to remove
water from the Basin could only be explained on blatant protectionist
grounds. Surely it is unfair to ascribe protectionism as the overriding motivation of the parties in adopting the Great Lakes Charter, the Charter Annex, or the proposed Compact itself. In its 2000 Report, the IJC noted that
"[i]f all interests in the Basin are considered, there is never a 'surplus' of
water in the Great Lakes system .
,"30 Given this reality, establishing
water budgets makes good sense.
127. An analogous and successful program operates with the Clean Air Act under the
cap and trade program for sulfur dioxide. Stationary sources are required to have a sufficient
amount of allowances (equivalent to one ton of SO 2 ) each year to cover their SO 2 emissions.
Fines of $2000/ton are imposed for each ton of SO 2 in excess of source allowances. Clean
Air Act § 411 (a), 42 U.S.C. § 765 lj(a) (2000).
128. See Hall, supra note 24, at 412 (arguing that "[w]ithout system-wide scarcity or
overuse, a capped allocation is not appropriate").
129. See David Dempsey, Bottling the Great Lakes: Whose Water Is It, Anyway?,
LANSING CITY PULSE, Dec. 10, 2003, http://www.lansingcitypulse.com/031210/031210cover
.html.
130. IJC 2000 REPORT, supra note 11, at 43. The IJC 2000 Report also noted that:
[T]he cumulative impact of past activity and the likelihood of future change will
further stress the integrity of the Great Lakes ecosystem and its ability to respond
to change. Global warming will likely increase and will likely change patterns of
consumptive use; in particular, higher average temperatures in the Basin could result in increased agricultural activity and water consumption in the longer term.
Id. at 29.
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Critics of a water budget approach also overlook its adaptability.
Budgets need be only as restrictive as necessary to address legitimate scarcity concerns. When scarcity problems arise, as they inevitably will, the
alternate framework, unlike the proposed Compact, offers a mechanism that
can directly and quickly address the problem. Furthermore, the alternate
framework suggested here will encourage states to develop and implement
conservation and demand-management practices.
The allocation of water resources to individual states and provinces
also opens opportunities for marketing water resources within states and
provinces and even between or among them. For example, if a state is
bumping up against its water budget, it might free up water resources for
new uses by allowing existing users to market all or part of their water
rights to new users, subject to state regulatory approval. 3' Or, if a state
efficiently manages its water, it might have the opportunity to lease a portion of its water resources to neighboring states or provinces. The natural
characteristics of the Great Lakes lend themselves to the efficient transfer of
For example, as already noted, Lake Huron and Lake
such water rights.'
Michigan are considered to be one hydrological unit due to their connection
through the deep Straits of Mackinac.'33 This suggests that water could be
easily transferred among the states and provinces that border these lakes
with little transfer loss.

The potential advantages of water marketing are well understood in the more
131.
water-scarce Western states but have been resisted in some parts of the East and Midwest
due to objections to treating water as a commodity. See Press Release, Sierra Club of Canada, Sierra Club and Sierra Club of Canada Call on Governors and Premiers: Protect Our
31,
2005),
(Mar.
Diversion!
or
Sale
from
Lakes
Great
http://www.sierraclub.ca/national/media/item.shtml?x=817 (last visited Apr. 2, 2007) (expressing support for a Great Lakes agreement that "ensures that water is recognized as a
human right, not a commodity"). But most if not all states treat their water resources as state
or public property subject to the public trust. Private parties only acquire the right to use the
water, and while the rules differ, parties can acquire such rights whether they are in a riparian
or prior appropriation jurisdicition. It is this use right that some states allow to be transferred
to other parties; the water resources themselves remain subject to public trust limitations. By
specifically defining the scope of a state's water rights and its public trust assets, the proposed alternate framework actually promotes the preservation of water resources and prevents the over-exploitation of this "commons" resource. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of
the Commons, 162 ScI. 1243 (1968).
Transferring water along a stream system is far more problematic because of
132.
possible harm to upstream or downstream users with such transfers. The slow moving water
in the Great Lakes allows large sub-basins within the Lakes to function more like a reservoir
where a quantity of water extracted from one point is essentially equivalent to a quantity
extracted at another point. For a more comprehensive discussion of the technical problems
surrounding water transfers, see generally Jay R. Lund & Morris Israel, Water Transfeis in
Water Resource Systems, 121 J. WATER RESOURCES PLAN. & MGMT. 193 (1995).
133. SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR THE GREAT LAKES, supranote 27, at 28.
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Additionally, the alternate framework provides opportunities for states
to encourage private parties to move water withdrawals away from the upper watersheds and closer to the lakes where they are far less likely to cause
ecological damage. For example, states might allow increases in water
withdrawals by private parties when withdrawals are taken from or near the
Great Lakes. II
It is important to understand that the alternate framework proposed
here does not make judgments about the merits of out-of-basin diversions.
But the existence of a water budget will provide the states and provinces
with a powerful incentive to keep as much of their water in the Basin as
possible so that it will be available to the state or province for other uses.
That is, if any state or province allows too much water out of the Basin, it
risks depriving its own citizens of adequate water supplies. Moreover, this
approach effectively responds to the concerns that have been raised about
the supposed slippery slope of allowing a single out-of-basin diversion.
States will be allowed to permit such diversions, but their total use will not
be allowed to exceed their budget. If the focus of the Great Lakes management initiative is truly on promoting the ecological health of the Basin and
not on discriminating against parties located outside the Basin, no one will
have cause to object.
Importantly, this alternate framework does not require any particular
permit or regulatory system for administering water rights. But the requirement that the parties acquire accurate and timely information about
water use will make it very easy for states to establish permitting standards
for both new and existing uses. And by imposing a water budget on each
state, the proposed framework provides a strong incentive for states to manage water use robustly so that they can assure that water is available for new
uses.
Despite the significant advantages offered by the alternate framework,
the challenges facing its implementation must not be overlooked. In particular, as previously noted, accurate data collection will be critical to the
success of this approach since the rights of all parties will depend on it.
Defining sub-basins may also prove challenging, although here the parties
could negotiate a flexible program that will allow the central authority to
adjust sub-basins to best reflect practical considerations and hydrologic
conditions as more is learned about managing the Basin's water resources.
Fortunately, the sheer quantity of the water resources in the Great Lakes
should allow the parties sufficient time to resolve these issues. But even the
vast water resources of the Great Lakes cannot justify a water management
134. While this opportunity could also be promoted under the proposed Compact, the
clear recognition of water as property under the alternate framework should make this opportunity easier to implement.
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program such as that offered by the proposed Compact that imposes such an
onerous burden on states for so little in return.
IV. THE ROAD TO AN ALTERNATE FRAMEWORK
Even assuming that momentum might build to take a fresh look at the
proposed Compact, it is difficult to imagine a path that would lead to an
entirely new approach to managing the water resources of the Great Lakes
Basin. The initiative that led to the development of the proposed Compact
and agreement was carried out under the auspices of the Council of Great
Lakes Governors,'35 and while the parties to that effort might agree to reconvene if the Compact is not ratified, they may be understandably reluctant
to commit the same level of resources and effort to an entirely different approach. Thus, an alternate framework may require an entirely new process.
It should be a process that is compatible with the original initiative, that
respects the work that has already been done, and that involves the principles in that effort to the extent possible. But the new process will ultimately
have to stand on its own.
While the parties might avail themselves of any number of separate
processes for rethinking the proposed Compact, one stands out as uniquely
suited to moving the management agenda forward in a manner that better
involves the Canadian provinces and that may even obviate the need for an
interstate Compact. As previously described, Article X of the Boundary
Waters Treaty allows Canada and the United States to refer to the International Joint Commission:
Any questions or matters of difference arising between the High Contracting Parties involving the rights, obligations, or interests of the United States or of the Dominion of Canada either in relation to each other or to their respective inhabitants.
. it being understood that on the part of the United States any such action will be
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and on the part 1of
His Majesty's
36
Government with the consent of the Governor General in Council.

Under this authority, Canada and the United States could refer to the
IJC a iluestion involving the allocation of water between the two countries,
and presumably, even among the various states and provinces within those
countries. Article X even contains a dispute resolution mechanism that will
assure that any matter referred is ultimately resolved. 37 Moreover, the
terms of the referral could be carefully structured to ensure that the IJC's
jurisdiction is fairly narrow. It could be asked, for example, to allocate with
specificity the water resources of the Great Lakes among the states and
135. See Council of Great Lakes Governors, Great Lakes Water Management Initiative, http://cglg.org/projects/water/index.asp (last visited Apr. 2, 2007).
136.
1909 Boundary Waters Treaty, art. X, supra note 17, 36 Stat. at 2453.
137. See id.
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provinces based upon historical use and other factors delineated by the referring parties. The IJC might also be asked to identify appropriate subbasins, taking into account hydrological and political boundaries, and to
allocate water among the relevant jurisdictions within those sub-basins.
Admittedly, over the nearly one hundred year history of the Boundary
Waters Treaty, Canada and the United States have never referred a matter to
the IJC for decision under Article X. 35 Yet there are several reasons for
optimism that a narrow referral focused on resolving allocation of Great
Lakes waters could happen. First, the Great Lakes Basin has more than
enough water to satisfy the current and reasonably foreseeable future needs
of the Great Lakes states and provinces. Thus, no party need worry that it
will be deprived of its essential water needs. Second, since the IJC has already calculated current water use levels by the states and provinces, the
parties already know their approximate allocation. Third, under the current
regime, as well as under the scheme established by the proposed Compact,
all parties have a perverse incentive to increase their share of Great Lakes
water use as against the other parties. This follows from the fact that while
the Supreme Court employs equitable principles in making allocation decisions among states,' 39 historical use is invariably considered as the starting
point for deciding what is equitable. 4 ' Finally, the parties, their leaders, and
138. DeWitt, supra note 23, at 313.
139. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 343 (1931) ("The different traditions
and practices in different parts of the country may lead to varying results, but the effort always is to secure an equitable apportionment without quibbling over formulas."). The New
Jersey case is the only case where the Court apportioned a river between two riparian states.
As such, it provides some insight into to how the Court might view an apportionment issue
involving the Great Lakes. The New Jersey case involved a proposal by New York to divert
a massive quantity of water from the Delaware River for New York City's municipal water
supply. See id at 341. New Jersey sought to enjoin the entire diversion but the Court essentially decided the case by determining the amount of water New York could take without
unduly harming New Jersey. See id. at 345-46. New York, the prospective "prior appropriator," was thus allocated 440 million gallons per day based upon the finding that this amount
of water could be withdrawn without causing harm to New Jersey's interests, which included
New Jersey's use of the water for municipal, industrial, and agricultural purposes, as well as
for recreational and fishing purposes. Id. Professor Tarlock describes the decision as "a
creative adaptation of the law of riparian rights to interstate conflicts." A. Dan Tarlock, The
Law of EquitableApportionment Revisited, Updated,and Restated, 56 U. COLO. L. REv. 381,
398 (1985). He notes that:
Historically, instream uses have been of greater importance compared to consumptive uses in riparian states, and the Court gave full weight to this aspect of riparianism by apportioning the most valuable attribute of the river, its base flow, and it
gave full weight to another core riparian concept, preservation of the status quo
among similar users.
Id.
140. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) (allocating the critical
reach of the North Platte River seventy-five percent to Nebraska and twenty-five percent to
Wyoming based roughly on historical use); see also Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310
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the vast majority of the Basin's residents sincerely desire a solution that
conserves and protects the water and water dependent resources of the Basin.' 41 If they understand that the current proposal, however well intentioned, is wholly inadequate to protect the Basin's water resources, then
they should be open to alternate solutions, especially a solution that is far
simpler, more efficient, less intrusive, and that can be easily configured to
protect the ecological health of the Basin.
CONCLUSION

The Great Lakes are an international treasure and they warrant a comprehensive program to insure their protection. For too many years, the parties with the greatest stake in protecting the Basin's water resources-the
states and provinces within the Basin-have failed, both individually and
collectively, to manage the lakes in a manner that will ensure their protection for future generations. The recent negotiations that led to the development of the proposed Compact offer a glimmer of hope that the states and
provinces are willing to take aggressive action to address this failure. Unfortunately, the prescription set forth in the proposed Compact is far more
complex and intrusive on state authority than it ought to be. More importantly, it is sorely inadequate for achieving the stated goal of the parties of
protecting and conserving the water and water-dependent resources in the
Basin. It may be daunting even to think about taking a fresh look at the
problem, but the alternate framework suggested here offers a vehicle around
which new negotiations might commence. The ecological health of the
Great Lakes hangs in the balance of the decisions made on the proposed
Compact. It would be foolish not to step back and take a fresh look, if not
for ourselves then for those future generations who will inherit the Great
Lakes.

(1984) (essentially granting the entire flow of the Vermejo River to the senior users in New
Mexico).
141.
A 2003 survey conducted for the Biodiversity Project and the Joyce Foundation
of 1,539 Great Lakes residents found that ninety-four percent agree that each resident bears a
personal responsibility for protecting the Great Lakes. See BELDEN RUSSONELLO &
STEWART,
SUMMARY

GREAT LAKES: RESPONSIBILITY
ANALYSIS

OF

PUBLIC

AND AWARENESS ABOUT A VITAL RESOURCE:
IN GREAT LAKES
STATES 2 (2003),

OPINION

http://www.joycefdn.org/news/content/downloads/surveyresults.doc.
Perhaps this overwhelming public support for protecting the Great Lakes will yet yield a solution that will
make everyone proud.

